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Abstract
The crisis in which we fi nd ourselves in 
2009 was hardly anticipated in this form; 
perhaps it could not have been anticipated. 
This explains the general consternation 
and shakiness at the horrendous sums, 
which up until recently no one had believed 
could pass through parliaments and the 
governmental beaurocracies not only in 
Germany but also in other European 
countries and even in China. 
No question: the monetary losses due to 
the fi nancial crisis are substantial. However, 
compared to other crisis phenomena this 
might not be the worst to come. We are 
confronted with an energy crisis, which at 
present is of  lesser interest, as due to the 
drop in general demand there is a corre-
sponding drop in demand for energy and 
therefore the oil price is going down. This 
is likely to be a short-term phenomenon, 
before the oil price recovers again and the 
energy crisis gains momentum. The limita-
tions of  the fossil energy resources stored 
in the earth’s crust are an immutable fact, 
making it necessary to prepare to use in 
the next future non-fossil energy resources.
Resumo
A crise na qual nos encontramos em 
2009 foi, de certa forma, um pouco 
antecipada; talvez não devesse ter sido 
antecipada, dada a consternação geral e 
instabilidade nos terríveis prejuízos que 
até recentemente ninguém acreditava que 
poderiam passar pelos parlamentos e 
burocracias governamentais, não somente 
na Alemanha como também em outros 
países da Europa, e até mesmo na China.
Sem dúvida: as perdas fi nanceiras devido à 
crise são substanciais. Porém, comparado a 
outros fenômenos de crise, este não deverá 
ser o pior por vir. Somos confrontados com 
uma crise de energia, que no momento 
é de interesse menor, visto que, devido à 
queda na demanda geral, há uma queda 
correspondente na demanda por energia e, 
portanto, o preço do petróleo está caindo. 
Provavelmente, este será um fenômeno a 
curto-prazo, antes que o preço do petróleo 
se recupere novamente e a crise energética 
ganhe força. As limitações dos recursos 
de energias fósseis armazenados na crosta 
terrestre são um fato imutável, tornado-se 
necessária a preparação para se usar, num 
futuro próximo, recursos de energias não 
fósseis.
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NATURE, WORK, AND VALUE - A FOURFOLD CRISIS
The crisis in which we fi nd ourselves in 2009 was hardly anticipated in 
this form; perhaps it could not have been anticipated. This explains the general 
consternation and shakiness at the horrendous sums, which up until recently no one 
had believed could pass through parliaments and the governmental beaurocracies 
not only in Germany but also in other European countries and even in China. 
For up to now we have always made the experience that it takes months in the 
selfsame parliaments before they would agree on spending a few Euros on social 
services, such as for Hartz IV recipients in Germany. 
Suddenly, the Maastricht criteria for budget policies―new debts not to 
exceed three percent of  the GDP), which seemed to be as immutable as the Ten 
Commandments found in the bible,―are no longer valid. We are concerned as the 
government is bailing out the banks, i.e. those who are responsible for the crisis 
and the wage losses, and bear no relation to the reductions of  income and social 
services forced on the working populace. All expectations of  justice appear to be 
violated, irrespective of  how they are justifi ed. It is perhaps because of  this that 
―paradoxically―much faith is placed in the resourcefulness of  politicians and their 
ability to overcome the crisis with huge amounts of  money. For, if  they were not to 
succeed, the losses would be horrendous, not only in monetary terms. Capitulation 
in the face of  crisis would be unconditional. This might explain why those who, 
in the course of  the last years, have always criticized the fi nancial markets and 
warned about their susceptibility to crises, i.e. movements critical of  globalization, 
such as ATTAC, were not suffi ciently heard by the concerned public.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the bad loans to amount 
to 23.200 billion dollars, of  which at least 10 percent, possibly more, will have to 
be written off  as bad debt as they have lost value. The Bank of  England is even 
more pessimistic than the IMF: it suggests the losses to date, i.e. the end of  2008, 
to amount to 3000 billion US dollars, though in April 2007 it had estimated these 
at a mere 1000 billion dollars.
No question: the monetary losses due to the fi nancial crisis are substantial. 
However, compared to other crisis phenomena this might not be the worst to 
come. We are confronted with an energy crisis, which at present is of  lesser 
interest, as due to the drop in general demand there is a corresponding drop in 
demand for energy and therefore the oil price is going down. This is likely to be 
a short-term phenomenon, before the oil price recovers again and the energy 
crisis gains momentum. The limitations of  the fossil energy resources stored in 
the earth’s crust are an immutable fact, making it necessary to prepare to use in 
the next future non-fossil energy resources.
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To this is to be added the climate crisis which will be more devastating in its 
effects than hitherto assumed. Just recently scientists found out that the increase 
of  carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is not 0,9 percent per year, as assumed by 
the Climate Council of  the United Nations (IPCC), but 3,5 percent, i.e. nearly 
four times higher. Thus we have to expect a faster and even more radical warming 
of  the earth’s atmosphere than previously assumed. As a consequence the sea 
levels will rise faster and the ice-shield at the poles will melt more drastically than 
hitherto assumed.
This will, in fact, result in a substantial loss of  wealth greater than that 
caused by the fi nancial crisis. Many people are suffering the consequences of  this 
loss on a smaller or a larger scale. But fi nancial losses can be reversed, and they 
are not lethal. But if  nature is changed by global warming, if  species of  plants 
and animals are eradicated, evolutionary process are altered and impaired. These 
losses are irreversible. No matter how much money we would be willing to spend, 
we could not reverse such a process.
2009 is the year of  Darwin and therefore such questions must be addressed. 
They can be answered with reference to the concept of  the doubling of  all economic 
processes, developed by a contemporary of  Darwin: Karl Marx. In his view, all 
economic processes of  value production are at the same time transformations of  
matter and energy, through which nature is both consumed and damaged. The 
degradation of  natural resources has given rise to the current ecological crisis. The 
other side, however, is their integration into the world of  values, of  commodities, 
money and capital. In the thinking of  neoclassical economists, this process creates 
a natural capital that has to be commercialized for the sake of  producing returns 
on investments, comparable to any other fi nancial investment. For some time this 
can appear to work, but not in the long run, as nature does not comply with the 
rules of  the accumulation of  capital. It is therefore no coincidence when fi nancial 
crises and environmental crises, amplifying each other, interrupt the progress of  
everyday life through a dramatic impact created by converging or complementary 
forces. It is this interruption of  the normality of  everyday life that is called crisis 
by Georg Lukacs.
The crisis has a further aspect, to which is paid little attention in the 
industrialized world, but which is signifi cant in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
That is the food crisis. The FAO, the Food and Agricultural Organisation of  the 
United Nations, estimates that one billion humans, that is every sixth individual on 
earth, are starving. This is an enormous number and every individual fate ought 
to be of  interest to us. But we must content ourselves with the data available. 
To alleviate the hunger of  billions of  habitants of  this world the FAO wanted 
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5, 3 billion US dollars direct aid from the wealthy nations. But the industrialized 
countries have diffi culties allocating these sums to combat the worst famine and 
to provide access to food and clean water. At the same time billions are handed 
out to banks to rid themselves of  “toxic” assets. One could therefore come to 
the following conclusion: we are in the midst of  one of  the most serious fi nancial 
crises in the history of  capitalism; we are in the midst of  a food crisis, that will be 
the cause of  death for many; we are in the midst of  an energy and a threatening 
climate crisis, and we fi nd ourselves in a moral crisis, scandalized by the fact 
that there is too little money available for the battle against hunger whilst at the 
same time the great banks are being bailed out. Future generations will certainly 
pillory the blatant injustices of  the generation now responsible, even if  some of  
them make a show of  social responsibility by making tax-deductible donations to 
NGOs or the United Nations to ameliorate the worst effects of  global hunger and 
demonstrate ‘corporate social responsibility’. But mercy based on the generosity 
of  private sponsors does not cure injustice, particularly when conditioned by tax 
rebates based on the submissions of  proofs of  donations, as the public sector 
now lacks money to fi nance social services.
II THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF MARX’S ANALYSIS OF THE 
CRISIS OF CAPITALISM
Impressed by the great and unexpected fi nancial crisis some politicians 
(among them even conservative ones) admitted that the crisis theory in the Marxian 
tradition might contain some truth., The break-down of  the subprime segment 
of  the real estate markets in the USA, in the UK, Ireland or to a lesser extent in 
Spain and the bankruptcy of  Lehman brothers on the 15th September 2008 really 
dragged the American investment banking system into the maelstrom. As a matter 
of  fact Marx spoke of  great world market ‘thunderstorms’―as these would be 
named in the language of  the nineteenth century―which would regularly shake 
capitalist world economy. These ‘great world market thunderstorms, in which 
the confl ict of  all elements of  the bourgeois process of  production is being 
discharged’ (MEW 13:156), the crises in the process of  accumulation of  capital, 
occurring with periodic regularity, does not only affect one or the other country, 
e.g. England as the country that is at the core of  capitalism in its time, but will 
engulf  the Continent, France, Germany and the United States. In the nineteenth 
century the United States did not yet play the role in world economy it does today.
The thunderstorms of  the world market accompanied capitalist 
accumulation, whose laws were analyzed in detail by Marx in the three volumes 
of  Capital, as well as in many other writings. In order to understand his writings 
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today, it is important to keep in mind that he distinguished between the real side 
of  the economic process, i.e. industrial capital and the industrial cycle on the one 
hand and the monetary aspect, i.e. interest-bearing capital on the other hand. He 
further considered it possible for the monetary and fi nancial system to become 
partly and temporarily independent of  the process of  real accumulation. The 
origin of  world market thunderstorms is sought for ‘within the most superfi cial 
and abstract sphere of  this process, the sphere of  monetary circulation’ (MEW 
13: 156). But he also provided the argument that and why the independence of  
the fi nancial markets, which we can also observe in the present fi nancial crisis, can 
never be absolute and will thus at some point reach its limits. In the fi nal analysis, 
the monetary claims of  the fi nancial sectors must always be fed by values produced 
by labour in the real economy as surplus value.
Consequently, Marxian theory does not assume the neoliberal doctrine 
of  the self-evident autonomy of  fi nancial economy vis-à-vis real economy. With 
the help of  fi nancial innovations―these existed in the nineteenth century, even 
if  the term was not familiar at the time―interest-bearing capital generates always 
new claims. Capital becomes fi ctitious, and if  the claims on returns that are made 
can no longer be met, this fi ctitious capital will crash on its fi rst reality test. This 
is what bank director Saccard and the many small stock exchange speculators in 
Emile Zola’s novel ‘Money’ (1891) discovered: the value of  shares can be driven 
up very far, but eventually the price-earning ratio becomes so unrealistic that the 
quotation is to be corrected downwards, with a crash, frequently in the form of  a 
downward avalanche into a bottomless pit. The company value, the market value 
of  monetary assets, sometimes has to be partially written off, sometimes even 
completely.
And there is another aspect to Marxian theory that is signifi cant and unique, 
distinguishing it from liberal as well as Keynesian approaches. This is the category 
of  the double character of  labour, developed by Marx in the fi rst chapter of  the 
fi rst volume of  ‘Capital’, and then used along the overall argumentation up to the 
analysis of  interest-bearing capital in the third volume of  ‘Capital’. The double 
character of  labour, commodities, and production is a most signifi cant discovery. 
With a certain amount of  self-praise Marx mentions that he sees this as the vantage 
point of  political economy, and that he has discovered this vantage point, which 
is doubtless the case. This vantage point determines that every economic process 
both has a material dimension and beyond that simultaneously has a value-related 
monetary and fi nancial dimension. Taking this into account we can possibly 
understand the relationship between the various sides of  the existing crisis: climate 
change, energy crisis, and food crisis are all related to the material basis of  capitalist 
Elmar Altvater
6
accumulation. The material side of  production, of  circulation, of  transport, of  
reproduction of  labour, demands that we feed energy and resources from nature 
into the economic system, as otherwise the economic processes, production as well 
as transport, would rapidly grind to a halt.Following the industrial revolution at 
the end of  the eighteen century, it is in particular fossil energy which is introduced 
into the production process and keeps it going.
Production only takes place when goods can be exchanged for money and 
when a surplus value is contained in the value of  commodities produced and when 
the value can be realised in the form of  money in the course of  the circulation 
process. Values are created, but only when the returns on advanced capital are 
suffi ciently high, when the rate of  profi t is assured and when the expectations 
of  capitalist enterprises are not disappointed. This generates fl ows of  income. 
When they are transformed into monetary wealth the (fi nancial) claims create a 
new category of  economic agents: the monetary wealth owners. They secure their 
fi nancial resources in specialist institutions, such as investment banks, savings 
banks. There the money assets are made to ‘work’, at least the illusion is created 
that money is ‘working’, as it can achieve a surplus of  interest and returns. One 
fails to see and understand that this surplus merely results from people working 
in the real world and creating those values and fl ows of  income, which are partly 
used to fulfi l the monetary claims of  the owners of  capital.
The idea of  money ‘working’ and generating ‘offspring’ was already 
criticized by Aristotle in the fourth century BC. The critique infl uenced the canonic 
prohibition of  interests in the catholic world which only was relinquished in the 
sixteenth century. It also had an impact on Islam and the persistent prohibition 
of  interest in the Islamic world until present. But the critique of  interests and of  
interest bearing capital was forgotten in the course of  the history of  philosophy 
and, later, in that of  economic theory, and it was only Marx who drew systematic 
attention to this fact by showing that the view of  interest as the ‘fruit of  capital’ 
has something to do with the fetish character of  money. That this fetishism has 
not vanished until today is something we can discover on TV, when the daily stock 
market quotations are listed prior to the news, as if  income were generated by the 
stock market. Yet, this is not the case: the stock market uses complex mechanisms 
for the redistribution of  wealth produced by workers in the process of  production. 
But this is of  no interest as the fetish of  money is overwhelming.
More than commodities money can become a idea, a fetish, a human artifi ce 
(fetish is derived from the Portuguese feiticio, which means ‘cobbled together’), 
gaining power over its creator, and even worse: in money all of  capitalist society is 
contained and exposed as false appearance - the form of  capital derives from the 
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form of  money. These relationships were analyzed by Marx in Capital in 1867, but 
even in earlier writings as in the ‘Grundrisse of  a Critique of  Political Economy’ 
and ‘Introduction to the Critique of  Political Economy’ of  the 1850s of  the 
nineteenth century. This is a not insignifi cant contribution to the understanding 
of  money in capitalist society, as we have to acknowledge today.
It is the contradictions of  the capitalist mode of  production that keep the 
system moving. But in the course of  the process of  accumulation they grow more 
acute and eventually reach crisis points that can interrupt the development of  the 
system. How do these crises occur? The possibility of  crisis is already contained in 
the form of  commodities and the form of  money. For as goods are sold, the seller 
is not obliged to spend the money he has earned immediately. At this point already 
the market is deprived of  the money which is hoarded rather than immediately 
spent as effective demand. The seller of  a commodity eventually travels to other 
places and spends his income there. This will support other commodity traders in 
the places where he travels. But the salespeople in the original place, to which the 
original commodities were sold in exchange for money,cannot meet the monetary 
demand which they need in order to sell their commodities. The circulation of  
goods and money has been interrupted, since buying and selling, selling and buying 
can fall apart in terms of  time and space.
The dissociation of  buying and selling in terms of  space and time becomes 
even more signifi cant if  we remind ourselves of  the fact that money can circulate 
autonomously and that payment promises (debts) can circulate bridging the gap 
between today and tomorrow. A debtor promises the lender, from whom he 
borrows money, to pay this back at a specifi c point in time. But due to unforeseeable 
circumstances the debtor cannot repay his debts. Yet the creditor was relying on 
having the money returned to him on time and has already made further purchases 
on the basis of  this expectation, which he will now have to cancel. Thus a chain 
reaction can be set off  in terms of  space and time. The payments and repayments 
no longer work as they are included in the contracts and plans of  the respective 
agents. The mere possibility of  crisis turns into bitter reality.
Many authors have explained the crises in capitalism in terms of  many 
economic agents making their plans independently of  each other, whilst being 
connected to each other through commodity- and payment chains, so as to affect 
the whole system, when somewhere something begins to slow down and grind 
to a halt. In the 1920s many analysts described the crises of  capitalism as results 
of  an anarchic system. The anarchy of  the market in the capitalist system could 
best be overcome if  the anarchic market were replaced by a planned economy. 
This was one of  the arguments for the organization of  capitalism (Hilferding’s 
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organized capitalism) or for an economic planning of  capitalism both within social 
democracy and among communist parties belonging to the Third (Communist) 
International.
The reality of  the crisis is more diffi cult to explain than the mere possibility. 
For, it is necessary to show systematically which causes are responsible for buyers 
and sellers separating, for purchases and sales falling apart. Without doubt the most 
signifi cant contradiction for the functioning of  the accumulation process is the 
one between the power of  consumption and the power of  production, between 
the value created by the workers and what they can buy back from the returned 
quota of  value as wage. Within capitalism the power of  production undergoes a 
process of  almost unlimited expansion, since every single capitalist hopes that he 
will be able to market more and thus make more profi t, the more he produces. 
The power of  production is thus extended, and not only that: capitalists also want 
to gain a competitive advantage on their competitors in different markets. This 
can only be achieved if  the costs are reduced. So there is an effective incentive 
to increase levels of  productivity, and one of  the most convincing messages of  
capitalist development already delivered by Adam Smith, the founding father 
of  political economy, is this: increased productivity leads to the increase in the 
‘Wealth of  Nations’. Marx accepts this positive message. One only has to read the 
Communist Manifesto of  Marx and Engels of  1848, containing an enthusiastic 
illustration of  the advantages of  capitalism over other forms of  society due to 
progress made possible by increased productivity of  work and the resulting wealth 
of  nations.
At the same time the increase in productivity means that the technological 
conditions are changing and that human work is successively replaced by machines, 
so that under certain circumstances working people are not layed off  but also made 
redundant. Accordingly, David Ricardo speaks of  the fact that in the course of  
capitalist development a ‘redundant population’ is created. Superfl uous people, 
particularly if  these people can be found any- and everywhere, have few powers 
of  negotiation. Trade unions are weakened in such a situation. This situation 
is further exploited by entrepreneurs aiming to lower wages. The power of  the 
market sweeps aside visions of  justice. Now two things can happen: on the one 
hand productivity increases, but the power of  consumption does not follow 
or not to the same degree. A gap opens up between the power of  production 
and the power of  consumption, which can result in a sales crisis. This can be 
interpreted as overproduction or underconsumption. In the past this question 
has triggered theoretical skirmishes which led to different theoretical schools or 
theory strands on questions of  crisis. Marx repeatedly emphasizes in Capital and 
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elsewhere that the contradiction between the power of  production and the power 
of  consumption represents one of  the most important reasons for the recurring 
crises of  capitalism. This contradiction has its origin in the dynamism of  capitalist 
accumulation. Crises theories only make sense if  they are related to the dynamism 
of  the accumulation of  capital. The development of  the profi t rate therefore has 
to be taken into account.
III CRISES AND CREDIT
In Marx’s time no developed credit system as we know it today, particularly 
in its globalized form, existed. Marx did provide a detailed analysis of  the credit 
system of  his times which is astonishingly modern. It constitutes the fi fth section 
of  the third volume of  Capital (MEW, Marx-Engels-Werke, vol 25). Originally, 
Marx had only written one chapter on this topic. It is the fi fth chapter of  MEGA, 
the Marx Engels Complete Edition. But Friedrich Engels divided this chapter, 
covering hundreds of  pages, into many individual chapters and called it Part Five.
Here Marx shows how interest turns into an autonomous source of  income, 
while in the end being an essential part of  surplus value. The ordinary capitalist 
thinks the interest and its returns on investment derive from the capital that was 
somehow invested somewhere. Marx declares this a fetish-driven conception, an 
illusion. Investment bankers today are the personifi cation of  that illusion which 
in the contemporary crisis turns out to be a misconception of  the revenues of  
capital. The revenues, the interests and other forms of  capital-income derive 
from the surplus value produced by labour in the ‘real’ economy and not from 
capital invested in the world of  global fi nance. The surplus value is redistributed 
through complex processes, as described in the individual chapters of  book fi ve, to 
enable interest-bearing capital to access interest yield. A sum of  capital deposited 
in a savings account accrues a certain amount of  interest at the end of  the year, 
and the subsequent year this interest gains interest on itself, thus turning into 
compound interest. The owner of  monetary wealth has no idea from whence the 
interest rates derive or that these are created by human labour. This creates the 
illusion mentioned that money generates money. But even the critics of  compound 
interest, frequently referring to Silvio Gesell’s arguments, remain caught up in the 
fetish character of  money. For they ignore the work and production processes, 
and therefore the capitalist character of  the credit system and believe they can do 
away with interest and compound interest, without touching on the creation of  
surplus value, from which interest derives.
In this fi fth section Marx further shows that interest, i.e. income stemming 
from interest-bearing capital, and the creation of  profi t in the real economy feature 
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a very specifi c cyclical and opposing course, which repeatedly peaks in crises. For 
if  interest of  fi nancial capital and profi ts of  real capital derive from the same 
source, namely the surplus value created by the workers, interest and returns on 
fi nancial capital can only grow, when profi ts are depressed and vice versa―unless 
the source of  both modes of  income, surplus value, is extended―by integrating 
new work forces into the system of  employment, by increasing the intensity of  
labour, or by increasing productivity and by putting pressure on wages. These 
means of  increase, however, have their limits to be found in the material and 
energetic dimension of  the processes of  production as well as in value relations, 
and also in the social power relations between wage labour and capital. Here again 
we must also take the double nature into account. At present the resource and 
energy restrictions are refl ected in the accessibility of  energy or in the carrying 
capacity of  the atmosphere for greenhouse gas emissions. These material limits 
provoke a competition between the profi t of  the today’s so called real economy 
and the interest in fi nancial capital. The productive forces of  labour would have to 
increase considerably to increase surplus in the real economy. But this is not going 
to be simple. For the productivity of  labour is not only a matter of  technology and 
organisation, is not simply within the power of  disposal of  the management, but 
has a social component. If  the increase in productivity is linked to an increase in 
the intensity of  labour, then the opposition of  the work force will be provoked. 
This has led to the failure of  past attempts to raise productivity and the intensity 
of  labour. This fact has been largely accepted in the social sciences and has led 
to the assessment that the presently dominant model of  increasing productivity, 
associated with the production line and the name of  Ford, which is fi nding its 
end and that a ‘Postfordism’ is about to be created, to overcome the limits to an 
increase in productivity on the basis of  a new technological paradigm. The limits 
to overproduction in industry, in real economy are indubitable, particularly if  we 
take into account the ecological conditions of  production. This can be described 
in greater detail than provided here, but the result will always be the same. An 
endless increase in real surplus to feed the fi nancial claims is out of  question.
On the other hand there are tendencies in the capitalist world economy to 
drive the demands of  global fi nancial markets even further. The 25 percent dream 
returns promised by Mr Ackermann (the CEO of  Deutsche Bank) provides an 
exemplar of  the stock market game of  the ‘bankocracy’, mentioned by Marx. 
Even in Marx’s times greed was the driving force of  the ‘character masks’ on the 
parquet fl oors of  the stock markets, described so impressively by Emil Zola in 
his novel ‘Money’. Marx writes at gthe end of  the fi rst volume of  ‘Capital’ that 
capital abhors the absence of  profi t or of  very little profi t, as nature abhors the 
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vacuum. With suffi cient profi t capital becomes audacious. At least ten percent 
and this can be applied everywhere. 20 percent, makes it exciting and 50 percent 
positively adventurous, for 100 percent it will trample on the laws of  humanity, 
300 percent and there is no crime it will not risk committing, even when faced 
with the gallows (MEW 23:788).
But there are new characteristics turning the role play of  the ‘character 
masks’ into an absurd one. Since the liberalization of  the global fi nancial markets 
in the 1970s and the collapse of  the fi xed currency system of  Bretton Woods, 
exchange rates, a central value in global economy, have no longer been determined 
by central banks and governments or international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund already mentioned. They are also no longer tied to the 
gold standard as it was in Marx’s times, but they are determined by private agents 
in markets. This can be interpreted as a process of  privatization of  public goods 
as suggested by Egon Matzner. This tendency was encouraged by the liberalization 
of  another crucial price regulating the global economy, i.e. the interest rates. It 
is no longer the central banks that determine the discount and prime rate―the 
agents in the fi nancial markets have to take this as their guide―but the rate of  
interest is determined spontaneously by the private exchanges of  large global 
banks, insurance companies and other fi nancial institutions involved in the global 
market. The ‘sovereignty of  determining the interest rates’ is thus lost to private 
agents operating in global fi nancial markets. To make this work without a hitch 
the international capital markets are liberalized. This liberalization took a long 
time until it was nearly perfect in the early 1990s. Liberal economists see therein 
an increase in the effi ciency of  the fi nancial system. Again, the effi ciency of  the 
fi nancial system is seen as a precondition and basis for the effi cient functioning of  
the economy as a whole, which eventually allows for the increase in the wealth of  
nations. Whoever opposes the liberalization of  the fi nancial markets opposes the 
increase in the wealth of  the populace and is thus a reactionary. This, at least, was 
the generally accepted opinion prior to the occurrence of  the fi nancial crisis.
The liberalization of  the fi nancial markets may be the most signifi cant feature 
of  globalization. One needs to keep in mind that competition on fi nancial markets 
differs from competition in normal commodity markets. There competition causes 
the prices to fall and quality of  goods to improve. This is good for everyone, it 
is a win-win-game. On fi nancial markets however fi nancial places and fi nancial 
institutions are competing, with a stable currency, with returns that are as high as 
possible and with the lowest possible taxes and restrictions for investors. In the 
wake of  the liberalization of  the fi nancial and currency markets pressure is thus 
created not to reduce prices, as would be the case in goods markets, but to push 
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interest and exchange rates up. This is why devaluations of  currencies are feared 
and also why a strategy of  undervaluation of  currencies is applied to create a 
permanent expectation of  revaluation.
The statistics in virtually all countries and for most of  the time show that 
since the beginning of  the 1980s the effective interest rates have been higher than 
the real growth rates of  the GNP. The interest rates have been higher than the 
profi t rates to be attained in the real economy. This is a fantastic incentive for all 
monetary wealth owners not to invest in the real economy creating jobs but to 
let the capital ‘work’ in the liberalized, global fi nancial markets. This is, in fact, an 
illusion. But since the 1980s and the liberalization of  the fi nancial markets this 
seemed to work quite well at fi rst. 
But only rather. It was always a crisis-ridden process. The fi rst major crisis 
occurred in the 1980s, shortly after the liberalization of  the fi nancial markets. This 
was the Third World debt crisis that affected all the Third World countries. First 
Third World countries had taken loans from private banks in the 1970s. These 
loans were cheap. They invested them into new factories, infrastructure etc. or 
used them on consumer goods, imports of  technology or arms purchases. Many 
Third World countries were military dictatorships, particularly in Latin America. 
They took on loans from banks with a high level of  liquidity as the oil profi ts had 
increased after the oil price shock of  1973 and the oil producing countries were 
able to recycle their capital to Third World countries through banks in London and 
New York. This was particularly opportune for the United States of  America, as 
it allowed the American banking system to move into the centre of  world fi nance 
or to improve its position there. Thus the dollar could be retained as oil currency, 
despite the dollar having lost in value considerably in the 1970s (in particular due 
to the disaster of  the US in Vietnam). This favoured the global hegemony of  the 
United States and its special relationship with oil producing countries. For Third 
World countries this arrangement was less advantageous. The 1980s are considered 
a ‘lost decade’ by all those countries affected by the debt crisis.
For they had their debts in dollars and the American Federal Reserve could 
still exert some infl uence, and this is precisely what Fed Chairman Volcker did in 
1979―he gave the Third World what is known as the ‘Volcker Shock’, an increase 
in interest rates, which resulted in most of  the Third World countries no longer 
being able to repay their external debts. This means that the real surplus of  the 
economies of  Third World countries did not suffi ce to repay the debts, the interest 
rates and amortizations owed to the First World fi nancial institutions. The debt 
crisis broke out. 
Every crisis contains an element of  opportunity―a principle that also 
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applies to the debt crisis of  the 1980s. This was used to enforce a new political 
model on all the nations of  the Third World and on those of  the Second World 
(the economies of  actually existing socialist countries), which still existed in the 
1980s according to which they had to open up their protected economies to world 
markets. This forced the Third World countries to adjust to the conditions of  
the world market. In the so called socialist countries this led to a collapse of  the 
planned economies and the disappearance of  a Real Socialist alternative. When the 
Iron Curtain fell in 1989 this set the seal on a development that had started years 
before. It fi rst started in December 1981 during the riots in Poland, initiated by 
Solidarnosc, that contributed also to debt servicing of  foreign investors not being 
covered any more and to the coup of  General Jaruzelski resulting in years of  a 
military dictatorship in Poland. This was the fi rst sign of  the irrevocable decline 
of  actually existing socialism.
During the debt crisis of  the 1980s banks had handed out loans to states 
or single creditors, and now these debts had to be converted and restructured in 
order to escape the debt crisis. This was quite complicated but fi nally it succeeded. 
During the fi nancial crises of  the 1990s in Asia and Latin America a different 
procedure was adopted, compared to that of  the previous decade. The then CEO 
of  the IMF, Camdessus, rather tellingly called the fi nancial crisis in Mexico the ‘fi rst 
fi nancial crisis of  the 21st century’. For other than in the previous decade Third 
World loans were securitized and could thus be exchanged on the world fi nancial 
markets: consequently the credit banks or fonds found it easier to rid them of  
loans they were not expecting repayment on. The fi nancial markets became more 
fl exible than in the previous decade and thus experienced an upsurge. But some 
crises of  a more superfi cial nature could not be avoided in the United States, like 
the savings and loan crisis or the ‘dotcom bubble’ of  the New Economy towards 
the end of  the 1990s.  
9/11 also played an important role, as the attack on the World Trade Centre 
caused the American Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan to react with a radical 
reduction in interest rates. This was intended to contain the consequences of  the 
disaster. This provided the basis for money that had been invested in the New 
Economy so far and which had not been annihilated by the burst of  the bubble in 
2000/2001. It also provided the basis for using that money for handing out loans to 
home-buyers and home-builders in the US.  This happened in view of  the fact that 
in those days the Bush Administration still pursued the massive individualist policy 
of  every American citizen having a right to their own home. From an ecological 
and social point of  view this is a quite frightening vision, but that was the policy. 
This resulted in an extended property boom, which collapse is causing so much 
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trouble. We shall, however, not forget that this subprime real estate crisis would 
not have had such a disastrous effect, if  it were not bolstered by toxic bonds from 
credit card deals, national debts and speculation on insurance bonds.
On the global fi nancial markets, where much money could be made, a whole 
range of  so called fi nancial innovations were developed and applied. In part they 
have historical models, and are therefore not as new as one might assume. But 
the widespread and global use of  new fi nancial instruments has contributed to 
the deployment of  ‘weapons of  mass destruction’ in fi nancial terms. This applies 
to the securitizations of  loans, for example. Single property loans, fi ve, ten, fi fty, 
fi ve hundred or fi ve thousand or more loans were collected as bonds of  different 
risk content in order to pass them onto a buyer in a bespoke form matching the 
purchaser’s requirements. The buyers were on the whole banks scouring the markets 
for derivatives and structured bonds. They bought them because they promised 
high returns. Some that had relatively low interest rates as the risk was low. Others 
promised high interest but they also contained a fairly high risk. In the end no one 
really knew for sure which loans were bundled in which bonds. In view of  this 
negligence concerning the opacity of  the system, this was countered by spreading 
the risks, making things easier for everyone: for when one spreads risks, everyone 
bears a smaller one. But this was not a spreading of  risk, but rather a veiling of  
existing risks by making them unfathomable. Securitization was a method of  
developing structured bonds and artifi cially creating ratable goods. Something was 
loaded with value that was possibly worthless. No one was really sure.
Structured bonds were all the more abundant the more banks and other 
agents of  fi nancial markets used so called leverages. Leverage means that the 
monetary resources of  a fi nancial institution or a fund were complemented by 
borrowing cheap foreign capital, as the interest rates were low, in order to extend 
the fi eld of  activity considerably. The additional capital functions as a lever which 
enables the fi nancial institutions to line their own pockets with more profi t, to put 
it fi guratively. This leverage is enormous. And from a microeconomic point of  
view it is quite rational. Yet, this rationality applies to individual institutions, and 
not to the system as a whole. For the system as a whole this leverage means that 
the primary liable equity capital, i.e. the assurance for all the loans made within the 
system, is less than the loans themselves, which leads to insuffi cient cover of  the 
credit risks, if  these occur. Precisely this happened. According to the calculations 
of  Nouriel Roubini the US banking system owns about 1.400 billion dollars of  
equity capital but has a depreciation need of  1800 billion dollars due to leverage 
(Sueddeutsche Zeitung, January 29, 2009; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 
28, 2009; Interview with Nouriel Roubini, in: Focus Money, February 4, 2009). In 
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Germany 1.000 billion Euros worth of  bad debt exceed the equity capital of  less 
than 400 billion Euros. Not only individual banks, but the banking systems in the 
United States and Germany as a whole are effectively bankrupt. This highlights 
the systemic character of  the present fi nancial crisis.
What are the further innovations? These include the formation of  
conduits, special purpose entities for releasing from stock the risks of  trading 
with structured bonds. Thus, they no longer affect the balance of  accounts and 
therefore no equity capital is required to provide cover. Consequently the liable 
equity capital, which according to the Basel agreements (Basel I and Basel II) is 
supposed to provide assurance on loans, is now freed for new investments. If  
it then possible to transfer the conduits to offshore centres (in the Caribbean, 
or in Ireland or other European countries) then the investors manage to evade 
the revenue offi ces or at least obscure their dealings. Few or no taxes are paid 
and social and ecological charges are notable for their absence. This enables the 
investors to make double or treble the profi t. All of  this is approved by the rating 
agencies. These have, as we know today, provided structured bonds with a triple 
AAA rating to bonds, even though they were in fact bad assets. Eventually even 
Prime Minister Merkel urged that rating agencies should be nationalized or that 
a public European rating agency should be created, as the private rating agencies 
have turned out to be unreliable.
Further, the emission of  so called Credit Default Swaps (CDS) belongs to 
the bundle of  fi nancial innovations since the liberalization of  the fi nancial markets 
of  the past decade.―CDS, that is insurance contracts on loans and the bundled 
structured bonds already mentioned. One can virtually not go bust as the risk is 
taken over by the insurance companies. That insurance company selling many of  
CDS is AIG (American International Group), possibly the world’s largest insurance 
company, which was facing bankruptcy in 2008 and had to be bailed out by the 
US Government at a cost of  billions of  dollars. We must therefore seriously ask 
the question whether the insurance companies are truly able to cover all risks, 
if  these turn into insurance claims. A sum that is commonly suggested but has 
not been verifi ed yet is that credit redemption agreements amount to 62.000 
billion dollars, i.e. they exceed global GDP. As soon as the fi nancial crisis engulfs 
the real economy, as soon as even large businesses meet fi nancial diffi culties, 
many of  these Credit Default Swaps will be due, and then the question arises 
whether the insurance companies will really be able to meet the demands or will 
have to throw in the towel and declare bankruptcy. The largest global insurance 
company―AIG―was partly nationalized in September, as it was unable to provide 
cover for far lesser bad loans.
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These fi nancial innovations are obviously part of  a system that no one 
thought out with diabolical intent, but which contains all the necessary ingredients 
to effectively strangle the real economy. This means that not only fi nancial losses 
result will have to be absorbed, but jobs are lost and the pressure on mass income 
and wages will increase.
THE STATE AS THE ‘IDEAL GENERAL BANKER’
No wonder then that the praise of  the liberal market, sung by liberalism 
and neoliberalism, suddenly sounds rather out of  tune and increasingly fewer 
people are prepared to sing it. By necessity the state enters the scene and has to 
attempt to rescue what the social sciences call ‘fi nancially driven capitalism’ out 
of  the vale of  crises, or at least to prevent it slithering further and further into it. 
By slight of  hand neoliberal, fi nance-driven capitalism turns into a nationalized 
and state driven capitalism. The state, described by Friedrich Engels as the ‘ideal 
universal capitalist’,―as it adopts all the functions essential to the system that are 
not fulfi lled by private enterprise as no profi t is to be made,―becoming the ‘ideal 
general banker’. Why is this so?
Globalization has indeed created free markets. In the European Union the 
different markets are largely free, but we do not have a global or international, 
not even a European Nation. On the European level the European Commission 
has access to less than 0, 9 percent of  the social product of  the member states 
as a source of  tax revenue. And now this weak European ‘nation’ is supposed to 
counteract or compensate the losses and depreciation needs that exceed thousands 
of  billions of  dollars by strong and therefore expensive investments. This will not 
work and thus recourse has to be taken to the nation state, which some neoliberal 
cynics would have liked to fl ush down the loo (these are the precise words chosen 
by an US American ideologue of  neoliberalism). The state is to heal the disease 
caused by the effect of  toxic assets. ‘Toxic papers’ sounds relatively harmless. 
Whoever sells toxic food will face imprisonment. If, however, someone sells toxic 
assets and makes a fat profi t, then he receives praise and a bonus. Some have no 
qualms to take legal action to obtain their bonuses, although it is the taxpayer who 
has to pay for the state funds fed into the banking system to compensate for the 
disaster created by these overpaid stock brokers.
The state is called upon because the nation state has the power to levy taxes 
and can draw on fi nancial resources the markets have no access to. These resources 
are the incomes of  the citizens of  the state in the form of  national taxes―now 
the tax regime provides a money supply to the banking sector by ensuring national 
funding. The market demands of  the banks in form of  their interest and returns 
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expectations are no longer covered by the banks and the bonds they guarantee have 
lost in value. The real surpluses of  the debtors derived from the ‘real’ economy 
are not suffi cient to cover the demands of  the banking sector.
The state will have to play the role of  ideal general banker, because in 
capitalist money society the fi nancial system is, as it were, a public good and 
because the downfall of  the fi nancial system would have greater repercussions 
than just the collapse of  some ailing banks, which might not be of  disadvantage: 
many jobs would be lost in the process; small investors would lose some of  their 
investments and if  they tried to prevent this by joining a ‘run’ on the banks this 
would threaten social stability. Therefore a solution to the fi nancial crisis must 
be found―no question about that. But whether this solution is to be achieved as 
proposed by the governments is something that requires public debate. For there 
are essentially three strategies that are being employed by the state:
The fi rst strategy is the recapitalization of  ailing banks. The state supplies 
the banks with fresh capital they require to cover the risks of  toxic assets. In this 
case the state would have to take over the management of  these banks as those 
providing the funds should also have a say in the running of  the business and thus 
becoming co-owners. To this Steinbruck, who had previously claimed that Marx 
might have been right, adopts a contrary position: bankers can run the banks far 
better than politicians can. Quod erat demonstrandum. This argument is neither 
consistent nor is it transparent. If  tax money is to be invested in banks and the 
state is to be turned into an ideal general banker then a responsibility of  the state 
for the banking business follows from the above. The principle of  transparency 
requires the owners to take part in the management of  a business. This is the 
inevitable conclusion. Joseph Stiglitz states clearly: if  the state provides funding 
to the banks and thus owns them without exercising control, then this is a step 
towards ‘disaster’.
Secondly, the state provides debt guarantees. This happened in the USA 
with its 700 billion USD debt guarantee, a strategy also pursued by the German 
Government, which passed a 480 billion Euro debt guarantee for the banks. In 
other countries the strategy is the similar. Thus banks are provided with assurances 
that allow them to trade amongst each other and to provide loans to customers 
to get the credit market off  the ground. The old adage according to which the 
warrantor is the one to be throttled needs to be kept in mind. We can only hope 
that this will not come into effect as it then would be the tax payers’ money that 
would then be due. The European Central Bank in its November 2008 report 
shows that 21 percent of  the GDP is being used for assurances. If  these are due 
then the European citizens are 21 percent poorer in GDP terms―not a small 
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sacrifi ce to safe the banks and bankers.
The third strategy of  the ideal general banker is the creation of  a so called 
‘bad bank’, a bank that administers the toxic assets while allowing other banks 
with good assets to become good banks again. All then depends on how long this 
bank is intended to last and which market value is adopted for the bad assets. This 
attitude was a source of  scorn for Emile Zola in his novel ‘Money’, commenting 
on the French fi nancial marketeers of  the nineteenth century. Those buying bad 
assets either had to be particularly sly or unscrupulous or they would inevitably 
lose out. For good reason were they called ‘wet feet’.
It will not be possible to avoid fi nancial claims to the real economy being 
written off. The state as ideal general banker would be successful if  this were 
to take place in some ordered form so as not to dent the effi ciency of  the real 
economy. Particularly wily individuals think they will be able to solve the problem 
by encouraging economic growth and thus stimulating the effi ciency of  the real 
economy. The ideal general banker should metamorphose into an ideal general 
capitalist on the basis of  a new and green Keynesianism. But this is where Marx’s 
double nature of  economic processes comes into play. We are not merely in the 
midst of  a fi nancial crisis but also within an energy crisis, a climate crisis, and a 
food crisis. The crises relating to the material and energy resources of  capitalist 
societies cannot be overcome by an increase of  real growth; on the contrary such 
growth very likely will accentuate them.
Therefore we will have to fi nd a ‘holistic approach’, permitting us to reduce 
the fi nancial demands by bringing them into line with the capacity of  the real 
economy to produce surpls value and profi t on capital while taking the ecological 
and social restraints into account. All this cannot happen over night, including 
the writing off  of  fi nancial assets―albeit in a great crash. But a great crash is not 
to be recommended, neither in social, political, economic, or ecological terms. A 
solution cannot merely aim at the fi nancial sector, but must include a restructuring 
and redimensioning of  the real economy under ecological and social premises. A 
social discourse in which these problems are discussed is required, particularly as 
it will take its time. Short-term and immediate solutions are no doubt required. 
But we will also require suffi cient stamina to think beyond capitalism as we know 
it today to develop and try out alternatives. 
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